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COMMENTS
BURTON v. CASCADE SCHOOL DISTRICT: FAILURE TO
RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A RIGHT TO REINSTATE-
MENT FOLLOWING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TEACHER
DISMISSAL
ILmoDumCrIoN
The right of a public school teacher not to be dismissed for con-
stitutionally impermissible reasons has been established, 1 but the appro-
priate remedy for violation of that right has not been determined
conclusively. In Burton v. Cascade School District Union High School
No. 5,2 a non-tenured high school teacher who had admitted being a
practicing homosexual was discharged pursuant to an Oregon statute
allowing mid-term dismissals for "immorality." 3 In a subsequent civil
rights action, the district court found the statute to be unconstitu-
tionally vague4 and awarded damages, but declined to order reinstate-
ment.5 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the
ground that the trial judge had acted within his discretion in striking
a balance between the interest of the teacher in completing her contract
and the interest of the State in avoiding disruption of the school system.'
The Burton decision illustrates the inherent difficulty in seeking
an accommodation between the competing interests of a public em-
1. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court stated:
For at least a quarter century this Court has made clear that even though
a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests ....
Id. at 597. This principle frequently has been applied to public employment. See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitr, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
Public Inst., 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1960); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
2. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975).
3. ORE. REv. STAT. § 342.530(1) (b) (repealed 1973).
4. Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Ore. 1973).
5. 512 F.2d at 851-52.
6. Id. at 852-53.
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ployer and an employee once a constitutional violation is found.
Because the hiring and firing of teachers is essentially a matter of local
law and policy, federal courts must accord school board discretion
great weight.7 The Supreme Court has recognized consistently, how-
ever, that a public employer may not act in derogation of constitutional
mandates in dismissing an employee.8 The implications of this restraint
are particularly significant in public education in which "[t] he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital . . . ." 9
Burton implied that a teacher's right not to be unconstitutionally
dismissed can be protected by a-remedy short of reinstatement, and
that reinstatement is an extraordinary remedy which need not be granted
as a matter of course.10 This Comment demonstrates that neither propo-
sition is valid.
Courts traditionally have been reluctant specifically to enforce per-
sonal service contracts even though termination was unlawful," espe-
cially where a probationary public employee was concerned. 2 Thus,
the Burton court considered reinstatement of a wrongfully dismissed
teacher to be an "extraordinary equitable remedy" usually reserved for
cases of either racial discrimination or impermissible restriction of free
speech. Many federal courts, however, acting under section 1983 of
Title 42,14 have ordered reinstatement of a public employee discharged
7. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court stated: "By and large,
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the
daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values." Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). School board discretion is
discussed in Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal
of a Pub!ic School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 549, 550-58
(1973).
8. See cases cited in note 1 supra.
9. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
10. 512 F.2d at 853.
11. Money damages are usually considered adequate and are preferred to avoid
personal conflicts. It would also be difficult for a court to enforce performance. This
rationale is less applicable to a dismissal challenged on constitutional grounds, because
anticipated conflicts, if severe, would be strong evidence that the state action in dis-
missing the employee is justified and therefore not in violation of the Constitution.
Furthermore, monetary damages are frequently considered inadequate for the enforce-
ment of constitutional rights. See generally, D. DOBBS, HANDBooK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES 929 (1973).
12. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 93 n.68 (1974).
13. 512 F.2d at 853.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
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in violation of his constitutional rights whether or not the employee
had tenure.'" Moreover, reinstatement has not been limited to racial
discrimination and impairment of free speech cases, but frequently has
been granted to redress dismissals violating procedural 6 and substantive
due process'7 and other fundamental rights.'8
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Public employment may not be conditioned upon a waiver of con-
stitutional rights.'9 Some restrictions are permissible, however, if a
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects . .. any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973), the Court held that a municipality
was not a "person" under Section 1983 and hence a federal court had no jurisdiction
over such an entity in a civil rights suit for damages or equitable relief. However,
courts have held that injunctive relief can be obtained against public officials sued in
their official capacities because of the legal fiction formulated by the Supreme Court
in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that unconstitutional acts done by a public
official "are stripped of [their] official .. . character," and that the official may be
ordered to perform his duties in a manner consonant with the Constitution. Id. at 160.
See Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Va. 1975); Harkless v. Sweeney
Indep. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 748-49 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Adamian v. University
of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Nev. 1973). For a general discussion of the
jurisdictional problems accompanying a suit for reinstatement and back pay under
Section 1983, see Rendleman, The New Due Process. Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J.
531, 615-24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rendleman].
15. Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973) (non-tenured teacher reinstated
after dismissal violating due process); Gieringer v. Central School Dist. No. 58, 477
F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973) (first amendment); Fisher v.
Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (fourteenth amendment due process); Stolberg v.
Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (first amendment);
Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 320 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala.
1970) (fifth amendment equal protection and fourteenth amendment due process);
Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) (fourteenth amendment
due process); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1003 (1967) (fourteenth amendment due process).
16. See notes 26-27 infra & accompanying text.
17. See note 43 infra & accompanying text.
18. See notes 33-44 infra & accompanying text.
19. "[Clonstitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler v. Board of Educ,
342 U.S. 485 (1952)] has rejected its major premise. That premise was that public
employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender
of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action."
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967). In Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Court specifically rejected the concept that acceptance
1976]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sufficient state interest can be demonstrated. 0 The balancing neces-
sitated by these conflicting interests goes to the question of whether
a permissible infringement of rights has been undertaken, and has little
relevance to the question of redress once an impermissible encroach-
ment is found.21
Procedural Due Process
The right of a teacher to challenge dismissal for lack of procedural
due process is contingent upon his demonstrating that he had a liberty
or property interest in his continued employment. 22 Given the exis-
tence of such an interest, the nature and extent of the protection re-
quired depend upon a balancing of that interest and the opposing
interest of the state furthered by dismissal.23 If the employment was
terminated pursuant to a procedure that did not afford sufficient pro-
tection to the employee's interest after taking into account the com-
peting state interest, the dismissal was unconstitutional.
The appropriate remedy for denial of procedural due process may
depend upon the nature of the employee's interest involved. Some
courts have deemed a post-dismissal hearing, where an employee can
vindicate his professional reputation, sufficient to rectify an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of his liberty interest.24 This approach also has
of government employment includes waiver of fundamental rights, a concept implicit
in the state court decision under review. "To the extent that the Illinois Supreme
Court's opinion may be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled
to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens ....
it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior
decisions of this Court." Id. at 568. See also cases cited in note 1 supra.
20. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d
334, 338 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974). See Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 365 U.S. 589, 602
(1967). See also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).
21. See notes 69-71 infra & accompanying text.
22. A teacher's right to procedural due process was clarified by the Supreme Court
in the companion cases of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Rotb, the Court explained that an interest
in liberty might be implicated when the state brings against the teacher a charge that
,'might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community" or impose a
stigma on him foreclosing future employment opportunities. 408 U.S. at 573. A
property interest must involve a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to reemployment, and
may be conferred by statute, contract, or policy. Id. at 577-78.
23. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970).
24. See Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1973) (probationary caseworker
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been utilized where a property right was concerned,2 5 but reinstate-
ment has been the more common remedy. 2 Arguably, a constitutionally
defective dismissal should be given no effect, a position adopted by
courts which have viewed reinstatement as an entitlement of the
employee.27
Substantive Constitutional Rights
In contrast to procedural due process protection, which is contingent
only upon a deprivation of a liberty or property interest,28 no such
showing is required to make a claim based upon denial of substan-
tive constitutional rights,29 with the possible exception of substantive
denied reinstatement, but hearing ordered); XVellner v. Minnesota State Jr. College
Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1973) (non-tenured teacher entitled to hearing).
See also Ferris v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 367 F. Supp. 459, 462-65 (D. Minn. 1973)
(non-tenured teacher entitled to hearing if liberty interest implicated); Rendleman,
supra note 14, at 612.
25. See Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974) (caseworker); Wellner v.
Minnesota State Jr. College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1973) (teacher); Lucas v.
Chapman, 430 F.2d 945, 948 (5th Cir. 1970) (teacher).
26. See Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board of Educ.,
453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972); Sigmone v. Poe, 381 F. Supp. 387 (W.D.N.C. 1974),
order dissolved after -hearing, 391 F. Supp. 430 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Parker v. Letson,
380 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ga. 1974); King v. Conservatorio de Musica, 378 F. Supp. 746
(D.P.R. 1974); Vagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973);
Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); cf. Vega v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
385 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corrections officer); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385
F. Supp. 1226 (D.P.R. 1974) (civil service employee); Young v. Hutchins, 383 F. Supp.
1167 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (city employees); Dahlinger v. Town Bd., 381 F. Supp. 474
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (police chief). For cases denying reinstatement because of no
expectancy of reemployment, see Bhargave v. Cloer, 355 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ga.
1972); Bates v. Hinds, 334 F. Supp. 528 (ND. Tex. 1971).
27. See, e.g., Vagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
Although the unconstitutional termination is considered void, the school board sub-
sequently can dismiss the teacher if such is done legally. "The law is clear in this
circuit . . . that an unconstitutional termination is a nullity and that a teacher is entitled
to reinstatement with back pay until the contract finally expires or school authorities
terminate a teacher's 'employment in a constitutional manner." Id. at 883 (emphasis
supplied). In Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969), the court stated that
an unconstitutionally dismissed teacher is "entitled to the benefits of his position
until he is lawfully separated from that position." Id. at 119 (emphasis supplied).
For purposes of procedural due process, however, an interest in continued employment
may be required before reinstatement is granted. Thus, if the judicial determination
that a dismissal was unconstitutional is not made before the expiration of a contract
term, the teacher may be entitled only to a post-termination hearing and damages. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
28. See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
29. That fundamental rights are treated separately from procedural rights was made
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due process."0 Neither teachers nor other public employees have abso-
lute rights; however, a compelling state interest may warrant some
circumscription of personal freedoms. Again, a weighing of interests
determines whether there has been an impermissible violation of con-
stitutional rights.31 A teacher's claim of discharge for the exercise of
a constitutionally protected right legitimately may be countered by a
showing that his conduct "materially and substantially interfere[d]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school." 32 If no such overriding state interest can be demonstrated, the
dismissal is constitutionally invalid.
Reinstatement as a remedy for deprivation of substantive constitu-
tional rights commonly has been awarded, as noted in Burton,33 in cases
of racially discriminatory dismissal or dismissal in derogation of free
speech rights. Discrimination charges often have arisen when the
implementation of desegregation plans has resulted in an unjustified
disproportionate release of black teachers. Upon finding unwarranted
discrimination, courts uniformly have ordered either reinstatement or
placement in the first available position in the school system for which
the employee is qualified. 34
clear in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Court held that the broad
principle against the government denying benefits for reasons violating "constitutionally
protected interests" applied whether or not a teacher had a property interest in re-
employment. Id. at 596-98. See Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v.
Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Rauls v. Baker Cy., 445
F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Wright v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1163 (S.D.
Tex. 1975); Stout v. Whiteaker, 379 F. Supp. 218, 222 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Hanover
Tp. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Commun. School Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757, 761
(N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972); McGee v. Richmond Unified
School Dist, 306 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
30. See Buhr v. Buffalo Public School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1200-03 (8th Cir.
1974); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974).
31. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
32. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969), quoting Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Although Tinker involved the suspension of
students, the "material and substantial" interference test has generally been followed
in teacher dismissal situations. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968);
Note, Teachers and the First Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies Under 42 US.C. Section 1983, 39 ALBANY L. REv. 661, 671-76
(1975).
33. 512 F.2d at 853 n.3.
34. See Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1974)
(reinstatement); Adams v. Rankin Cy. Bd. of Educ, 485 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1973)
(reinstatement); United States v. Chesterfield Cy. School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72-73
(4th Cit. 1973) (reinstatement); United States v. Cotton Plant School Dist. No. 1,
(Vol. 17:781
TEACHER REINSTATEMENT
Reinstatement for discrimination has been applied beyond the deseg-
regation context, and has been granted as a matter of course whenever
unjustifiable discrimination has been demonstrated. 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Smith v. Hampton Training School,"0
recognized the efficacy of reinstatement as a remedy for discriminatory
discharges. Holding that section 1983 of Tide 42 was "designed to
provide a comprehensive remedy for the deprivation of constitutional
rights," the court required reinstatement because "[o]therwise [the
aggrieved employees] would not be made whole, and similar discrim-
inatory discharges would be encouraged." 37
Infringement of the right of free speech is subjected to particular
scrutiny by federal tribunals, and reinstatement has been granted rou-
tinely to teachers impermissibly released for exercising that right.38 The
use of reinstatement has not been limited to cases of abrogation of free
speech and unlawful discrimination, however. The recognition that a
public employee's fundamental first and fourteenth amendment rights
may not be abridged by dismissal 9 has led to the granting of reinstate-
ment for dismissals in contravention of the rights of free association,40
479 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1973) (reinstatement); Lee v. Roanoke City Bd. of Educ,
466 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1972) (reinstatement); Lee v. Macon Cy. Bd. of Educ,
453 F.2d 1104, 1114 (5th Cir. 1971) (reinstatement); Rauls v. Baker Cy., 445 F.2d 825,
826 (5th Cir. 1971) (reinstatement); Moore v. Board of Educ., 448 F.2d 709, 712-14
(8th Cir. 1971) (first available job); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ, 391 F.2d 77 (6th
Cir. 1968) (reinstatement); Smith v. Board of Educ, 365 F.2d 770, 784 (8th Cir. 1966)
(first available job); Franklin v. County School Bd, 360 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1966)
(reinstatement); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist, 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1163
(S.D. Tex. 1975) (reinstatement); McCurdy v. Board of Public Inst., 388 F. Supp. 599,
603 (D.C. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1975) (reinstatement).
35. See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F2d 577, 581
(4th Cir. 1966).
36. 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966).
37. Id. at 581 (emphasis supplied).
38. See, e.g., Gieringer v. Central School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973);
Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Moore
v. Gaston Cy. Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Starsky v. Williams,
353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), modified, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
Cole v. Choctaw, 471 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 US. 948 (1973) (bus
driver).
39. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's dismissal from
public employment may not be based on his exercise of his right to speak on issues
of public importance); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (legitimate government
purpose cannot be pursued by overbroad regulations). See also cases cited in note 1
supra.
40. See, e.g., Hanover Tp. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Commun. School Corp,
318 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aft'd, 457 F2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) (teacher's contract
1976]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
equal protection,41 privacy,42 substantive due process, 43, and other first
amendment protections.44
An additional consideration favoring reinstatement as an appropriate
response to a constitutionally impermissible discharge of a teacher is
the solicitude toward academic freedom evinced by the Supreme Court.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,4 5 the Court noted:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom.46
Refusal to order the reinstatement of a teacher dismissed unconstitu-
tionally arguably tends to inhibit other educators in their exercise of
individual rights and restricts the free inquiry that is essential to a viable
educational system, a result the Supreme Court repeatedly has sought to
prevent.4 7
not renewed because of union activities); cf. Doherty v. Vilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D.
Ga. 1973) (teacher refused employment because of associations).
41. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 320 F. Supp.
477 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher dismissed for wearing moustache).
42. See, e.g., Drake v. Covington Cy. Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (dismissal for immorality).
43. See, e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (unsupported con-
clusion of misconduct); Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1971) (arbitrary
and capricious -regulation against moustaches); Bradley v. Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216
(E.D. Tex. 1974) (arbitrary and capricious dismissal of teacher because of pregnancy);
Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973) (vague statute);
Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (arbitrary and capricious
regulation regarding appearance); Webb v. Lake Mills Commun. School Dist., 344
F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (arbitrary and capricious application of regulation
against profanity); Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388
(D.N.H. 1971) (dismissal based on unverified complaints and rumors).
44. See, e.g., Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(non-renewal based on teacher's allowing student to write letter to cafeteria head);
Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher dismissed for assign-
ing controversial book). See also McGee v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 306 F.
Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (community service workers dismissed for signing peti-
tion and participating in tax election).
45. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). For a thorough discussion of the development of the right
to academic freedom, see Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right
to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176 (1973).
46. 385 U.S. at 603.
47. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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The frequent application of reinstatement to remedy unconstitu-
tional dismissals of public employees and the singular effectiveness of
this remedy for enforcing constitutional protections belies the propo-
sition that it is an extraordinary remedy in the area of public employ-
ment. Many courts have characterized reinstatement or an alternative
guaranteed opportunity of future employment as an entitlement'8 of
the dismissed employee. Absent extraordinary circumstances, it should
be granted as a matter of course.
Burton DECISION
In Burton an admitted homosexual was dismissed from her teaching
position pursuant to a statute authorizing such action upon a finding
of "immorality." She brought a civil rights suit seeking damages and
reinstatement.49 The trial judge determined that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague, invalidated the dismissal, ordered the school board
to expunge all records of the termination proceedings, and awarded
damages and attorney's fees, but refused to order reinstatement. ° No
further justification was advanced for dismissal relative to the plain-
tiff's teaching ability or her disruptive impact upon the functioning of
the school.
Appellate Decision
The sole issue on appeal was the refusal of the trial court to grant
reinstatement; the unconstitutionality of the dismissal was conceded.
Noting the right of a public employee not to be discharged unconstitu-
tionally,"'the circuit court nonetheless found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's action. The balance struck between the interest of the
teacher, which the court noted was not of a nature "such as to compel
reinstatement," 52 and the interest of the state in avoiding disruption
of its school system was found to justify limiting relief to expungement
of the records and damages.5
48. "[V]here there is no lawful basis for the discharge, the plaintiff is entitled to be
restored to the position he occupied . . . " Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1338 (4th
Cir. 1974) (emphasis supplied). "Even if he had no right to compensation nor to
permanent tenure he nevertheless had the right not to be relieved of his teaching
opportunity for unconstitutional reasons . . . ." Moore v. Gaston Cy. Bd. of Educ.,
357 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (XV.D.N.C. 1973) (emphasis in original).
49. Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973).
50. 512 F.2d at 851-52.
51. Id. at 852 n.1.
52. Id. at 853 n.3.
53. Id. at 852-53.
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The appellate decision reflected several questionable premises bearing
on the significance and nature of the interests infringed, the proper role
of the balancing test, and the efficacy of any remedy short of rein-
statement.
The Nature of the Rights Violated in Burton
As noted above,54 the Burton perception that the use of reinstate-
ment has been limited to cases involving racial discrimination and free
speech 55 is unduly narrow. The remedy commonly has been granted
where substantive constitutional rights have been abrogated. The uncon-
stitutionally vague statute under which the school board in Burton
acted effectively infringed substantive first amendment rights by inhib-
iting conduct that otherwise was protected. "The threat of sanctions
may deter [the exercise of first amendment rights] almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions." 56
The chilling effect of such overbroad laws was noted and condemned
by the Supreme Court in Keyisbian v. Board of Regents.57 There, sec-
tions of New York laws and regulations requiring dismissal of public
employees for broadly-defined subversive activities were held uncon-
stitutional, 58 repugnant to the first amendment, 9 and incompatible
with academic freedom." The Court specifically recognized "the legiti-
macy of [the state's] interest in protecting its education system from
subversion," but emphasized that even a "legitimate and substantial"
governmental purpose "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." "' An impermissibly vague statute such as that involved in
54. See notes 33-44 supra & accompanying text.
55. 512 F.2d at 853.
56. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
57. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
58. Id. at 604.
59. "'Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, govern-
ment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity' . . . . New York's ...
scheme plainly violates that standard." Id., quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963).
60. 385 U.S. at 603-04. See note 45 supra & accompanying text.
61. Id. at 602, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1962);
Cramp v. Board of Public Inst, 368 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1961). In NAACP v. Button, the
Court stated that "[tihe objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not
depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled dele-
gation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First
Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
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Burton implicitly violates first amendment rights.62 The fundamental
importance of those rights, especially in education, demands their
vigorous protection when abrogated.63
Although the teacher in Burton was not deterred by the statute from
engaging in homosexual activity, she nonetheless was deprived of sub-
stantive due process by being dismissed in accordance with a law that
failed "to give fair warning of what conduct [was] prohibited" and
permitted "erratic and prejudiced exercises of authority." ' That her
activity could have formed proper grounds for dismissal, assuming that
the school board's discretion was not limited to the statutory grounds
and that procedural due process was afforded, was irrelevant to the
question of whether her dismissal violated substantive due process. In
Adarnian v. University of Nevada,65 a university professor's employ-
ment was terminated for disrupting R.O.T.C. activities. The district
court held that the university regulation on which the dismissal was
based was void for vagueness6 and ordered reinstatement, although the
professor's conduct might have been sufficiently disruptive to support
dismissal under a valid ordinance. The court reasoned that "[b] ecause
the section upon which the Regents relied [was] substantively uncon-
stitutional, the Regents could not rely on it and the plaintiff must be
reinstated and compensated for loss of earnings." 6 7
The teacher in Burton was dismissed for her admitted homosexuality,
although she could not have known from the pertinent statute that this
improper application." 371 U.S. at 432-33 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of
vagueness and the first amendment, see Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal
Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Canpus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REv. 855,
858-63 (1974).
62. See Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D. Nev. 1973).
63. In recognizing that reinstatement was used commonly to rectify infringement of
free speech, Burton indicated an understanding of the fundamental nature of first
amendment rights, but the court failed to perceive the first amendment implications
of the statute before it, see note 62 supra & accompanying text. The substantive due
process violation, upon which the invalidation of the dismissal was based, see note 64
infra & accompanying text, obscured the coincident infringement of associational
rights. Hence the court, in reviewing the remedy, discerned only a right that it did
not consider fundamental, 512 F.2d at 853 n.3, and failed to comprehend the first
amendment problem. This approach invariably would preclude recognition that an
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad statute impinges rights other than that of sub-
stantive due process.
64. 353 F. Supp. at 255 (footnote omitted). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
65. 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973).
66. Id. at 830-31.
67. Id. at 831.
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conduct would justify termination of her employment. Even if the
state could show a legitimate and' sufficient interest in proscribing homo-
sexuality among teachers to justify discharge, action taken before
adequate notice of the prohibition was given would nonetheless have
violated substantive due process because the person charged would
have had no opportunity to avoid the sanction."
Balancing of Interests
The court of appeals in Burton approved the trial court's weighing of
employee and state interests to determine that reinstatement was not
compelled. To justify the discretion inherent in that process, Burton
found supportive language in the Fifth Circuit decision of Fred v. Board
of Public Instruction.6 Fred determined that "the remedy.., might well
... depend" on the comparative importance of employee and state
interests.70 But the balancing process in Fred controlled only the ques-
tion of whether an impermissible abrogation had occurred. If a legi-
timate state interest outweighed that of the dismissed employee, then
the infringement was allowable and no remedy was necessary.71 The
impermissibility of the constitutional violation was conceded in Burton,
rendering inapposite the use of a balancing test to determine the
remedy.
Nor could the denial of reinstatement be brought within the broad
equitable discretion traditionally vested in federal courts to redress
violations of federally protected rights.72 A judge may not refuse to
"apply well-settled principles of law to a conceded state of facts." 71
Thus, discretion alone cannot support foreclosure of reinstatement to
remedy a dismissal in contravention of a substantive constitutional right,
68. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
69. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
70. Id. at 859. In Pred, two teachers allegedly had been dismissed because of their
participation in a teacher association. The court held that a cause of action had been
stated sufficiently because first amendment rights were involved, even though the
teachers had no property interest in reemployment. The case was remanded for a
determination on the merits, and the lower court was instructed to consider all the
evidence when considering both the possible violation and the remedy. 415 F.2d 851
(5th Cir. 1969).
71. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
72. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). The discretion, however, is usually
applied to remedy the wrong adequately. "[W]here federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922).
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as that alternative has become a generally accepted means of redress
in such cases. 74
Finally, potential disruption, even if shown, should not preclude
reinstatement. This proposition demonstrates the impropriety of bal-
ancing interests to determine a remedy. 5 In Sterzing v. Fort Bend
independent, School .District,6- a teacher was discharged for making
statements critical of the school board. After finding violations of both
first and fourteenth amendment rights, the trial court awarded damages
to the teacher but refused to order reinstatement, believing the mone-
tary damages adequate and desiring to avoid revival of antagonisms.7
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on
the ground -that such ;disruption was not a legitimate reason to deny
reinstatement. "Enforcement of constitutional rights frequendy has
disturbing consequences. Relief is not restricted to that which will be
pleasing and free of irritation."
The Adequacy of a Remedy Short of Reinstatement
Reinstatement in a Burton-type situation serves the dual purposes of
compensating -an -employee for the deprivation of his constitutional
rights and deterring the employer from violating those rights in dis-
missing an undesirable employee. I As the Supreme Court has evidenced
particular concern for individual freedoms in education,80 the impact
of aqt unconstitutional dismissal should be minimized. "Academic free-
dom is not preserved by compulsory retirement, even at full pay."
74. See notes 33-44 supra & accompanying text.
75. Cf. notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
76. 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. 376 F. Supp. 657, (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (1973).
78. 496 F.2d at 93. The court held- that the trial court erred by awarding the plaintiff
damages for his expectancy of ,reemployment in lieu of reinstatement. Id. In Langford
v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1973), the court observed that the Su-
preme Court had "rejected the proposition that interference with constitutional rights
can be justified on the grounds that the community is hostile to their exercise and
vigorously displays its feelings," Id. at 267. See Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535
(1963),; Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 156 n.2 (1962); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 16 (1958); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917).
79. See Burton v. Cascade School Dist., -572 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. See notes 45-47 supra & accompanying text.
81. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 363 (1st Cir. 1969)., There may be a more
compelling reason vitiating the adequacy of damages in a section 1983 suit, though
it went undiscussed in Burton. As the Supreme Court has held that a municipality
is pot a "person", under section 1983 for the purpose of obtaining damages, Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973), some courts have held that damages
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The ramifications of a failure to reinstate an unconstitutionally dis-
missed teacher extend beyond the individual case. A successful removal
of one "undesirable" teacher, even if at a price, will tend to inhibit
others in the exercise of their constitutional rights, depending upon their
desire to continue working in the same school system. Thus, the inter-
ests of both individual and community academic- freedom strongly
suggest that reinstatement should be granted as a matter of course to
an unconstitutionally dismissed teacher.
Some discretion in the implementation of the remedy is appropriate,
however. A mid-term reinstatement may be difficult for the students, or
a replacement may have been hired. Hence, immediate reinstatement
has not been applied without regard for the needs of the school system.
Courts accordingly have ordered reinstatement at the beginning of a
term,8,2 or have ordered that the teacher be offered the first available
position for which he is qualified. 3
Conclusion
The court in Burton misconceived the nature of the rights violated,
and consequently failed to examine the remedy closely to test its ade-
quacy. A presumably competent teacher was dismissed pursuant to
cannot be obtained against school board members in their official capacities. Harkless
v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 746-47 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Patton v.
Conrad Area School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 410, 417 (D. Del. 1975); O'Brien v. Galloway,
362 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Del. 1975); Sigmon v. Poe, 381 F. Supp. 387, 393 (W.D.N.C.
1974), dissolved, 391 F. Supp. 430 (1973). Damages then would have to be sought
against school officials in their individual capacities with attaching qualified immunity;
thus the plaintiff would have the additional burden of showing bad faith. See Wood v.
Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1000-01 (1975). Contra, Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520
F.2d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1975) (policeman can sue officials for damages even though
"felt by the City"); Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Va. 1975) (county
officials may be sued for damages); Seaman v. Spring Lake Indep. School Dist. No. 16,
387 F. Supp. 1168, 1170-71 (D. Minn. 1974) (individual board members liable even
though money would come from county).
82. See Smith v. Board of Educ, 365 F.2d 770, 783 (8th Cir. 1966).
83. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon Cy. Bd. of. Educ., 453 F.2d 1104, 1112 (5th Cir. 1971).
The court said: "The fact that the school board has already hired another to fill that
vacancy obviously cannot prevent appropriate relief by a court of equity in vindica-
tion of the law and the Constitution." Id.
There may be room in this area of the law for the development of a doctrine allow-
ing the state, in extraordinary cases, to show that reinstatement would have such a
deleterious effect upon the educational process as to mandate some alternative remedy.
Such-a doctrine should place a heavy burden of proof upon the state subject to re-
buttal by the teacher, and should be countenanced only in extreme circumstances.
This concept would give additional flexibility to the court and its infrequent applic-
ability would minimize any adverse impact upon academic freedom.
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an unconstitutionally vague statute, thus violating her right to substan-
tive due process. Failure to grant her reinstatement gave effect to the
illegal action of the state. The award of monetary damages did not
restore the right of the teacher not to be unconstitutionally dismissed.
Further, the wider implications of the result in Burton run counter to
the strong protection traditionally accorded academic freedom.
Broad and equitable discretion is indispensable to the selection and
award of adequate relief. That discretion, however, should not preclude
a vigorous remedy for the deprivation of a substantive constitutional
right. That a public school teacher cannot be dismissed in violation of
the constitution is beyond dispute; that reinstatement is the appropriate
remedy for an unconstitutional dismissal should be the established rule.
